April 1971: Anwar al-Awlaki born in Cruces, N.M. while father is on diplomatic posting and studying for a master’s degree.

1978: Leaves U.S. and moves with family to Sana, Yemen.

Jan. 13, 1988: Issued U.S. passport.

June 5, 1990: Enters U.S. in Chicago with Yemeni passport with J-1 exchange visitor U.S. visa issued in Sana’a.

June 6, 1990: Applies for Social Security card. Claims he was born in Sana’a, Yemen.

June 8, 1990: SSN 521-77-7121 issued to Awlaki.

Aug. 21, 1991: Enters U.S. in Chicago.

1991: Attends Colorado State University on a scholarship from Yemen.

Jan. 29, 1992: Enters U.S. in New York City.

1993: Awlaki visits Afghanistan. “My impression was that he didn’t like it there,” Abdul Belgasem, a fellow student at CSU, tells Time magazine. “He wouldn’t have gone with al-Qaeda. He didn’t like the way they lived.”

Nov. 18, 1993: Applies for a U.S. passport in Fort Collins, Colo.

1994: Marries cousin from Yemen, Gihan Yosen Baker.

1994: Graduates from Colorado State with bachelor’s in civil engineering. Awlaki’s knowledge of the Koran and his ability to preach in English land him a job as imam of the Denver Islamic Society.

Aug. 26, 1995: Awlaki’s son, Abdulrahman, born in Denver, Colorado.

1996: Named imam of Masjid al-Rabat in San Diego.

August 1996: Busted for soliciting a prostitute in San Diego. Pleads guilty to a lesser charge. Enrolls in HIV and AIDS education program and fined $400.

Time uncertain: Arrested by San Diego police “for hanging around a school.” (9/11 Commission MFR FBI Agent #59

April 5, 1997: Busted again for soliciting a prostitute in San Diego. Sentenced to three years’ probation, fined $240, and ordered to perform 12 days of community service.

1998 & 1999: Serves as vice president of Charitable Society for Social Welfare Inc., the U.S. branch of a Yemeni charity headed by Abdul Majeed al-Zindani. Federal prosecutors in a New York terrorism-financing case later describe the charity as “a front organization” that was “used to support al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.”

January 1999: Enrolls in San Diego State University master’s in educational leadership program. SDSU spokesman says the school does not have records showing Awlaki earned a degree.

June 1999: FBI investigates Awlaki after learning that he may have been contacted by Ziyad Khaleel, who bought a satellite phone bin Laden used in the 1990s.

1999-2000: During its investigation, FBI learns that Awlaki knows individuals from the Holy Land Foundation and others involved in raising money for the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas. Sources alleged that Aulaqi had other extremist connections. (9/11 Commission Report)

February 2000: Four calls between Awlaki and Omar al-Bayoumi, a Saudi who helped Al-Hamzi and Almihdhar find an apartment in San Diego. An FBI agent tells 9/11 Commission staff he is “98 percent sure” that the two hijackers were using al-Bayoumi’s phone at this time. (9/11 Commission MFR FBI Agent #63)

Early 2000: Visited by a subject of a Los Angeles FBI investigation closely associated with Blind Sheikh [Omar Abdel] Rahman. (Congressional Joint Inquiry on 9/11)

Early 2000: Several sources tell FBI that Alwaki “had closed-door meetings in San Diego” with Alhazmi, al-Midhar and another unidentified person “whom al-Bayoumi had asked to help the hijackers.” (Congressional Joint Inquiry)

Feb. 3, 2000: FBI electronic communication, background searches re: Awlaki. (9/11 Commission report)

March 2000: FBI closes its investigation, stating “the imam … does not meet the criterion for [further] investigation.” (Congressional Joint Inquiry on 9/11)

July-August 2000: Resigns from San Diego mosque.

Summer-Fall 2000: Travels abroad to “various countries.” (SD Union-Tribune 10/1/01)

January 2001: Moves to Virginia. Employed at Dar Al-Hijra Islamic Center in Falls Church, Va., largest mosque in the country.

January 2001: Enrolls in George Washington University’s Graduate School of Education and Human Development, pursing a Ph.D in human resource development.

Unknown: Meets Nidal Hasan, future Fort Hood shooter.

Early 2001: Named Muslim chaplain at GWU.

April 2001: Al-Hazmi and Hani Hanjour arrive in Falls Church and attend Dar Al-Hijra mosque. Awlaki denies having contact with the men in Virginia. (9/11 Commission report)

July 20, 2001: Delivers sermon at Friday Jummah Prayer in U.S. Capitol.

Before Sept. 11, 2001: Awlaki returns briefly to San Diego (9/11 Commission MFR) “Reportedly acted suspiciously by declining help with boxes he was transporting in a rental car (driven only 37 miles) and by refusing to provide any local address to the rental agent.” (9/11 Commission MFR FBI Agent #59)

August 2001: According to NY Times, Awlaki tells neighbor Lincoln Higgie, “I don’t think you’ll be seeing me. I won’t be coming back to San Diego again. Later on you’ll find out why.”

Sept. 17, 2001: In comments published on IslamOnline, Alawki suggested that Israelis may have been responsible for the 9/11 attacks and that the FBI “went into the roster of the airplanes and whoever has a Muslim or Arab name became the hijacker by default.”

September 2001: German authorities find Awlaki’s phone number in the Hamburg home of Ramzi Binalshibh, a Yemeni who was a leading figure in the 9/11 plot.

Sept. 15-19, 2001: Interviewed four times by FBI. Awlaki says he did not recognize Hazmi’s name but identifies his picture. Admitted meeting with Hazmi several times, he claimed not to remember any specifics of what they discussed. Describes Hazmi as a soft-spoken Saudi student who used to appear at the mosque with a companion but who did not have a large circle of friends. Does not identify Almihdhar.

September-November 2001: Interviewed numerous times by reporters, including National Geographic, Ray Suarez and The Washington Post.

After Sept. 11: Attends Muslim outreach luncheon at the Secretary of the Army’s Office of General Counsel, according to documents obtained by Fox News.

2001-2002: Awlaki observed allegedly taking Washington-area prostitutes into Virginia. Authorities contemplate charging him under the Mann Act, reserved for nabbing pimps who transport prostitutes across state lines.

Feb. 5, 2002: Awlaki delivers lecture to senior Defense officials at the Pentagon on Islam and Middle Eastern politics and popular culture. See here.

Feb. 11: Awlaki leaves for U.K.

March 31, 2002: Lectures at Quran Expo in London

April 2002: Employment with Dar Al-Hijra mosque ends.

2002: Federal prosecutors in Colorado receive information from Ray Fournier, a federal diplomatic security agent in San Diego who was investigating Awlaki for passport fraud.

June 2002: Figures in Operation Green Quest, a terrorism-related money-laundering investigation.

Mid-2002: Radwan Abu-Issa, the subject of a Houston Joint Terrorism Task Force investigation, sends money to Awlaki, according to a document in a restricted government database. Awlaki’s name was placed on an early version of what is now the federal terror watch list.

June 17, 2002: Federal magistrate in Colorado signs warrant for Awlaki’s arrest for passport fraud.

October 2002: A federal diplomatic special agent in Colorado began investigating in preparation to take the case to a grand jury learns Awlaki corrected the place of birth on his Social Security application to New Mexico.

Oct. 8, 2002: FBI electronic communication, interview re: Awlaki. (9/11 Commission Report)

Oct. 9, 2002: Arrest warrant rescinded.

Oct. 10, 2002: Arrives in New York on a Saudi Airlines flight from Riyadh. Briefly detained by INS.

Oct. 11, 2002: Criminal case terminated.

Late 2002: Visits Fairfax, Virginia home of Ali al-Timimi, a radical cleric, and asked him about recruiting young Muslims for “violent jihad.” Al-Timimi, is now serving a life sentence for inciting followers to fight with the Taliban against Americans.

Late 2002: Departs U.S. for London.

June 2003: Delivers lecture at Muslim Association of Britain symposium in London

December 2003: Islamic Forum of Europe lecture: “Stop police terror.”

Dec. 18, 2003: British MP Louise Ellman tells House of Commons calls Muslim Association of Britain is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood; says Awlaki “is reportedly wanted for questioning by the FBI in connection with the 9/11 al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.”

Early 2004: Moves to Yemen.

2004: Lectures at Imam University in Sana’a, Yemen, a school headed by Abdul Majeed al-Zindani.

Mid-2006: Awlaki arrested in Yemen on “charges of kidnapping on charges of kidnapping for ransom and being involved in an al-Qa’ida plot to kidnap a U.S. official.” (Source) Claims he was held at the request of the U.S. government.

Oct. 17, 2006: Yemeni secret police raid swept up eight foreigners living in Sana’a, under surveillance by the CIA and British intelligence, and at least 12 other men across Yemen. Yemeni authorities insist they dismantled an al-Qa’ida cell and disrupted a gun-running ring to neighbouring Somalia, although no evidence is found. Awlaki (identified as “Abu Atiq”) said to be key to the raid.

September 2007: FBI agents interview Awlaki in prison. Ask about contacts with 9/11 hijackers.

December 2007: Awlaki released after 18 months confinement in Yemen, almost all of it in solitary confinement.

February 2008: Registers www.anwar-alawlaki.com

February 2008: U.S. counterterrorism officials link Awlaki to terrorism, The Washington Post reports. “There is good reason to believe Anwar Aulaqi has been involved in very serious terrorist activities since leaving the United States, including plotting attacks against America and our allies,” an anonymous U.S. counterterrorism official tells the Post.

Unknown: Awlaki leaves Sana’a and moves to remote Shabwa region.

Dec. 17, 2008: Maj. Nidal Hasan contacts Awlaki via e-mail. “Do you remember me? I used to pray with you at the Virginia mosque.” Awlaki tells Al-Jazeera: “He was asking about killing American soldiers and officers. [He asked] whether this is a religiously legitimate act or not.”

“…the first message was asking for an edict regarding the [possibility] of a Muslim soldier killing his colleagues who serve with him in the American army. In other messages, Nidal was clarifying his position regarding the killing of Israeli civilians. He was in support of this, and in his messages he mentioned the religious justifications for targeting the Jews with missiles. Then there were some messages in which he asked for a way through which he could transfer some funds to us [and by this] participate in charitable activities.”

December 2008: San Diego JTTF opens investigation into intercepted e-mails between Awlaki and Maj. Nidal Hasan. (FBI statement)

Jan. 1, 2009: Awlaki speaks via satellite link at London Muslim Centre. Event organized by Noor Pro Media.

January 2009: In blog post, Awlaki asks: “Today the world turns upside down when one Muslim performs a martyrdom operation. Can you imagine what would happen if that is done by seven hundred Muslims on the same day?!”

Jan. 7, 2009: San Diego Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) sends a detailed memo on Awlaki’s communications with Hasan to the Washington, DC JTTF. Later e-mail described as “more serious” not shared.

January 20, 2009: Al Qaida forces in Yemen unite under the umbrella of Al Qaida in the Arabian Pensinsula (AQAP), headed by Nasir al-Wahishi. According to U.S. Treasury Department, Awlaki swearsan oath of loyalty to al-Wahishi.

February 2009: Awlaki blog post, “I pray that Allah destroys America and all its allies and the day that happens, and I assure you it will and sooner than you think, I will be very pleased.”

Feb. 25, 2009: FBI leadership in Washington JTTF assigns the information from San Diego to the Defense Criminal Investigative Service.

Early 2009: E-mail contacts continue between Awlaki and Hassan.

March 15, 2009: AQAP claims credit for attacks that kills four South Korean tourists and their guide in in the city of Shibam in Hadramut; days later, a convoy of Korean officials sent to investigate is attacked.

May 27, 2009: The DCIS begins its inquiry on the last day of the standard 90-day deadline for completing inquires based on the information from the San Diego JTTF. The inquiry was conducted, concluded, and summarized in four hours on a single day.

July 2009: Awlaki praises insurgent attack on Yemeni troops in Marib.

Aug. 4: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Nigerian suspected of trying to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253, attends Sana’a Institute for the Arabic Language, according to the Yemeni Foreign Ministry.

August: The U.S. National Security Agency intercepts al-Qaida conversations about an unidentified “Nigerian.”

Aug. 27: AQAP claims credit for an attack that narrowly missed Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, a senior member of Saudi Arabia’s ruling family and head of the kingdom’s counterterrorism operations. Suicide bomber detonated PETN bomb hidden in his underwear.

Sept. 6: In a meeting with Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh pledged unfettered access to Yemen‘s national territory for U.S. counterterrorism operations. ”I have given you an open door on terrorism. so I am not responsible,” according to a secret dispatch back to Washington obtained by Wikileaks.

Sept. 21: Abdulmutallab leaves Sana’a Institute.

Fall: NSA intercepts“voice-to-voice communication” between Abdulmutallab and Awlaki indicating that Aulaqi “was in some way involved in facilitating this guy’s transportation or trip through Yemen.”

October: Abdulmutallab travels to Shabwa province. A U.S. government sentencing memo, based on Abdulmutallab’s own statements to investigators,  prepared by government attorneys prosecuting Abdulmutallab, sheds light on what happened next:

During their brief telephone conversation, it was agreed that defendant would send Awlaki a written message explaining why he wanted to become involved in jihad. Defendant took several days to write his message to Awlaki, telling him of his desire to become involved in jihad, and seeking Awlaki’s guidance. After receiving defendant’s message, Awlaki sent defendant a response, telling him that Awlaki would find a way for defendant to become involved in jihad.

October: CIA rebuffs Yemeni government request for help locating Awlaki for possible capture operation, according to The Washington Post’s David Ignatius. CIA concluded that it could not assist because the agency lacked specific evidence that he threatened the lives of Americans. A Yemeni request for U.S. Special Forces’ help on the ground in pursuing Awlaki also refused.

Nov. 5, 2009: Hasan allegedly kills 13 at Fort Hood. FBI agent in San Diego tells colleague: “You know who that is. That’s our boy.”

Nov. 7, 2009: Post on Awlaki’s website praises Hasan as a “hero.”

Time Unknown: FBI, CIA, NSA, NCTC conduct interagency “scrub” of Awlaki’s contacts to determine who poses a threat. (Michael Leiter, testimony 1/20/09 before Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee.)

November 2009: Abdulmutallab swears allegiance to the emir of AQAP and shortly thereafter received instructions from Aulaqi to detonate an explosive device aboard a U.S. airplane over U.S. airspace. After receiving this direction from Awlaki, Abdulmutallab obtained the explosive device he used in the attempted Christmas Day attack. (Source: U.S. Treasury Department news release) In Sept. 24 court filing, Director of National Intelligence says Awlaki’s role included “preparing” Abdulmutallab for his operation.

Dec. 7, 2009: Abdulmutallab leaves Yemen for Ethiopia.

Dec. 14, 2009: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton designates Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula aka Al Qaeda in Yemen as a terrorist organization. Two AQAP leaders, Nasir al-Wahishi and Said Ali al-Shihri, also designated as terrorists

Dec. 23, 2009: Al-Jazeera broadcasts interview with Awlaki.

Dec. 24, 2009: Awlaki falsely reported as killed in Yemeni airstrike.

• On orders from President Barack Obama, ABC News reports, the U.S. military launched cruise missiles against two suspected al-Qaida sites: a suspected training camp north of Sanaa and a location where officials said “an imminent attack against a U.S. asset was being planned.”
• Yemen Embassy states Yemeni air forces targeted “scores of Yemeni and foreign al-Qaida operatives” at a remote location southeast of Sanaa. Awlaki “presumed to be at the site” along with Nasir al-Whaishi, senior leader of Al Qaida in the Arabian Pensinsula (AQAP) and his deputy, (former Guantanamo detainee) Said al-Shiri.
• Official Yemen state news agency, SABA, reports attack targeted an al-Qaida hideout in the Rafdh area of the al-Said district in Shabwa province.

Dec. 25, 2009: Rep. Pete Hoekstra, senior Republican on House Intelligence Committee, suggests there may be a link between Awlaki and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

Dec. 29, 2009: Alwaki became “operational” sometime over past year, senior U.S. official tells Fox News.

“Late” 2009: Awlaki’s name added to separate lists of maintained “High Value Targets” and “High Value Individuals” maintained by U.S. Joint Special Operations Command’s list and the Central Intelligence Agency

Jan. 3, 2010: “Mr. Awlaki is a problem. He’s clearly a part of Al Qaida in Arabian Peninsula. He’s not just a cleric. He is in fact trying to instigate terrorism,” said John Brennan, deputy national security advisor for counterterrorism and homeland security.

Jan. 14: Ali Mohamed Al Anisi, the director of Yemen’s National Security Agency and a senior presidential adviser, said talks were under way with members of Mr. Awlaki’s tribe in an effort to convince the cleric to turn himself in.

Jan. 19: Awlaki tells Yemeni journalist he has no intention of surrendering and denies Yemeni government claims that negotiations were underway aiming at a surrender.

Jan. 20: Senate Foreign Relations Committee report: “Although Awlaki has not yet been accused of a crime, U.S. intelligence and military officials consider him to be a direct threat to U.S. interests.”

Jan. 25: ABC News reports, “White House lawyers are mulling the legality of proposed attempts to kill an American citizen, Anwar Awlaki … according to two people briefed by U.S. intelligence officials.”

Jan. 27: The Washington Post:

• “U.S. military teams and intelligence agencies are deeply involved in secret joint operations with Yemeni troops who in the past six weeks have killed scores of people….”
• “As part of the operations, Obama approved a Dec. 24 strike against a compound where a U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi, was thought to be meeting with other regional al-Qaeda leaders. Although he was not the focus of the strike and was not killed, he has since been added to a shortlist of U.S. citizens specifically targeted for killing or capture by the JSOC, military officials said.”
• “Both the CIA and the JSOC maintain lists of individuals, called “High Value Targets” and “High Value Individuals,” whom they seek to kill or capture. The JSOC list includes three Americans, including Aulaqi, whose name was added late last year. As of several months ago, the CIA list included three U.S. citizens, and an intelligence official said that Aulaqi’s name has now been added.”

Jan. 31: LA Times: “While Awlaki has not yet been placed on the CIA list, the officials said it is all but certain that he will be added because of the threat he poses. … Awlaki is already on the military’s list, which is maintained by the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command.”

Feb. 1, 2010: Awlaki tells Yemeni journalist that he met Abdulmutallab:

• “Umar Farouk is one of my students; I had communications with him,” Awlaki says
• Yemeni Foreign Minister Rashad Alimi states Abdulmutallab met Awlaki at a remote meeting place in Shabwa province.
• Abdulmutallab tells FBI that Alwaki personally blessed attack.

Feb. 2: Awlaki tells Al-Jazeera that he did not order the Christmas Day airliner bombing, but expresses support.

Feb. 3: Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair says intelligence community may assassinate U.S. citizens involved in terrorism. “We take direct actions against terrorists in the intelligence community,” he said. “If we think that direct action will involve killing an American, we get specific permission to do that.”

Feb. 5: CBS News: “The suspect in a failed Christmas Day airliner bombing attempt told federal investigators that radical Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Awlaki directed him to carry out the attack, CBS News has learned”

Feb. 25: British Airways employee  Rajib Karim arrested in a plot to attack UK airliners. E-mails between Karim and Awlaki in early 2010 were found on at the suspect’s computer. Awlaki asked Karim, “Can you please specify your role in the airline industry, how much access do you have to airports, what information do you have on the limitations and cracks in present airport security systems.” In a separate email, Awlaki told Karim that “our highest priority is the U.S.,” and asked if it was possible to get a package or person on board a flight heading to the U.S.”

March 19: Awlaki calls on American Muslims to take up Jihad against the United States.

Early 2010: Justice Department produces secret memo authorizing the assassination of Awlaki. “What constitutes due process in this case is a due process in war,” an official tells The Washington Post.

March 26: CIA Director Leon Panetta tells WSJ Awlaki is “clearly” someone the agency is seeking. “There isn’t any question that he’s one of the individuals that we’re focusing on.”

April 6: Rep. Jane Harman, Democrat of California and chairwoman of a House subcommittee on homeland security, calls Awlaki “probably the person, the terrorist, who would be terrorist No. 1 in terms of threat against us.”  Harman, who recently visited Yemen to meet with U.S. and Yemeni officials said, ”He is very much in the sights of the Yemenis, with us helping them.”

April 22, 2010: Rep. Charlie Dent of Pennsylvania introduces House resolution (H.Res. 1288) that would strip Awlaki of his U.S. citizenship. According to the resolution, Awlaki ” furthered his teachings by interpreting and translating into English the writings and theories of Yousef al-Ayyiri, who founded al Qaeda’s operational network in Saudi Arabia and acted as the mastermind behind the May 2003 suicide bombings in Riyadh.”

May 2010: A U.S. drone targets al-Awlaki but the mission fails. According to CNN, Awlaki and a Saudi member of AQAP were traveling in a pickup truck. The drone shot three missiles at the vehicle and missed. Eventually, Awlaki and his Saudi companion switched vehicles with two of his supporters  Awlaki and his companion escaped; another missile strike hit the pick-up truck, killing two brothers who were suspected al Qaida members. The drone was under control of the U.S. military.

May 1: Faisal Shahzad tried to detonate a car bomb in Times Square. Mr. Shazad pleaded guilty in the plot and told investigators that he was inspired by Mr. Awlaki.

May 14: Roshonara Choudhry, a 21-year-old British student, told the London police that she stabbed a member of Parliament after listening to more than 100 hours of Mr. Awlaki’s speeches “explaining stories from the Koran and explaining about jihad” online.

May 23: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula released a 45-minute interview with Awlaki, who justifies killing American civilians.

June 3: DOJ reveals that Awlaki had been in e-mail contact with 29-year-0ld Barry Walter Bujol in Texas. Awlaki provided Bujol with a document entitled “42 Ways of Supporting Jihad.” Bujol asked Awlaki for advice on how to provide money to the “mujahideen” overseas.

June: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) releases English-language Inspire magazine on the Internet. Awlaki listed as contact and author of main article “May Our Souls Be Sacrificed for You.” Calls for assassination of Seattle Times cartoonist Molly Norris, who drew this cartoon.

June: The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel completes a 50-page secret memorandum that concludes Awlaki is a lawful target and authorizes his execution, provided he cannot be captured, according to The New York Times. The memo clears the way for a CIA drone strike against Awlaki.

July 7: Awlaki’s father, Nasser al-Awlaki, retains the Center for Constitutional Rights and the American Civil Liberties Union to bring a lawsuit in connection with the government’s decision to authorize the death of his son.

July 13: CNN reports that the FBI has warned Molly Norris of death threats.

July 16: The U.S. Department of the Treasury designates Awlaki as a “specially designated global terrorist” (SDGT) and describe him as a key leader for al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a Yemen-based terrorist group. Any assets Aulaqi has under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen pursuant to Executive Order 12334 No U.S. persons may engage in any transactions with him.  Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey: Awlaki is involved in every aspect of the “supply chain of terrorism — fundraising for terrorist groups, recruiting and training operatives, and planning and ordering attacks on innocents.”

July 20: The United Nations al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions Committee formally lists Awalki as an al-Qaida associate, calling him a leader of AQAP.  “Al-Aulaqi has also recruited individuals to join AQAP, facilitated training at camps in Yemen in support of acts of terrorism, and helped focus AQAP’s attention on planning attacks beyond the Arabian Peninsula,” the committee declared.

July 22: Paul and Nancy Roockwood, Muslim converts living in King Salmon, Alaska, plead guilty to lying to FBI agents about a terrorism hit list. After converting to Islam in 2001-2002, Paul Rockwood became a “strict adherent to the violent Jihad-promoting ideology of cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. This included a personal conviction that it was his (ROCKWOOD’S) religious responsibility to exact revenge by death on anyone who desecrated Islam,” according to plea agreement.

Aug. 3: The Center for Constitutional Rights and the American Civil Liberties Union file suit in U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C. against the Department of Treasury and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (ACLU v. Geithner, 2010cv-1303). Also see “Why We Sued to Represent Muslim Cleric Awlaki.”

Sept. 14: AP reports “The Obama administration is considering filing the first criminal charges against radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki in case the CIA fails to kill him and he is captured alive in Yemen.” ACLU response.

Sept. 24: WSJ: “A terrorism task force led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in San Diego for years has been building a case against Mr. Awlaki, according to people familiar with the matter. Obama administration officials have recently weighed whether to bring an indictment against him, these people say.”

Sept. 24: In a court filing, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper says Awlaki is “playing a key role in setting strategic direction for AQAP. Al-Aulaqi has also recruited individuals to join AQAP, facilitated training camps in Yemen in support of acts of terrorism, and helped focus AQAP’s attention on planning attacks on U.S. interests.” Clapper also notes that Awalki is a dual citizen of Yemen and the United States.

Oct. 2010: According to President Obama, Awlaki “directed” a plan to “blow up U.S. cargo planes.” Powerful bombs were shipped from Yemen to Jewish groups in Chicago. The packages were intercepted in Britain and Dubai.

Dec. 7, 2010: D.C. District Court Judge John Bates dismisses the lawsuit brought by Awlaki’s father. See Unanswered Questions.

Time Uncertain 2010: The CIA creates a new counterterrorism unit known as “YSD,” or the Yemen-Somalia Department, in which dozens of targeting specialists comb over raw intelligence and other data searching for clues to the whereabouts of al-Qaeda figures, according to The Washington Post.

Jan. 27, 2011: A Yemeni court sentences Awlaki in absentia to 10 years in prison for inciting to kill foreigners, according to Yemen’s Saba News. The court hands down a death sentence for Hisham Muhammad Ahmed Asim, 19, convicted of killing a Frenchman a year earlier under incitement from Awlaki.

Feb. 9, 2011: Michael E. Leiter, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, tells the Homeland Security Committee: “I actually consider Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula with Al-Awlaki as a leader within that organization probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland.

May 2011: Yemen is gripped by an uprising against President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime.

Mid-September: The CIA and military’s Joint Special Operations Command begin two weeks of intermittent surveillance of Awlaki.

Sept. 20, 2011: The Washington Post reports that the the CIA is building a secret airstrip in the Arabian Peninsula so it can deploy armed drones over Yemen. The newspaper later reports that the CIA facility in the Arabian peninsula would play a key role in Awlaki’s assassination. The Post agrees not to disclose the exact location of the new CIA drone base at the request of the Obama administration. Other reports indicate the base is located in Saudi Arabia.

Morning of Sept. 30, 2011: Yemeni security officials locate Awlaki in a house in the village of Al Khasaf in Al Jawf Province. The information comes from a recently captured al Qaida operative, according to Thew New York Times. The information is passed to the CIA, which begins tracking Awlaki’s movements. After Awlaki leaves the house, a missile launched from a unmanned U.S. drone. Awlaki is killed along with a second American, Samir Khan, who edited al-Qaida’s Internet magazine, was also killed in the same airstrike on their convoy.

Statement of President Barack Obama in Fort Meyer, Virginia:

Earlier this morning, Anwar al-Awlaki — a leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula — was killed in Yemen. (Applause.) The death of Awlaki is a major blow to al Qaeda’s most active operational affiliate. Awlaki was the leader of external operations for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In that role, he took the lead in planning and directing efforts to murder innocent Americans. He directed the failed attempt to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day in 2009. He directed the failed attempt to blow up U.S. cargo planes in 2010. And he repeatedly called on individuals in the United States and around the globe to kill innocent men, women and children to advance a murderous agenda.

The death of al-Awlaki marks another significant milestone in the broader effort to defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates. Furthermore, this success is a tribute to our intelligence community, and to the efforts of Yemen and its security forces, who have worked closely with the United States over the course of several years.

Awlaki and his organization have been directly responsible for the deaths of many Yemeni citizens. His hateful ideology — and targeting of innocent civilians — has been rejected by the vast majority of Muslims, and people of all faiths. And he has met his demise because the government and the people of Yemen have joined the international community in a common effort against Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula remains a dangerous — though weakened — terrorist organization. And going forward, we will remain vigilant against any threats to the United States, or our allies and partners. But make no mistake: This is further proof that al Qaeda and its affiliates will find no safe haven anywhere in the world.

Oct. 14: Awlaki’s 16-year-old son, Abdulrahman, also a U.S. citizen, is killed in a U.S. military strike that left nine people dead in southeastern Yemen. According to the Awlaki family, Abdulrahman “along with some of his tribe’s youth have gone barbecuing under the moonlight. A drone missile hit their congregation killing Abdulrahman and several other teenagers.”

Oct. 24: US State Department press briefing: